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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
****************************** 
FASHION FOUR CORPORATION, 




FASHION PLACE ASSOCIATES, 
a limited partnership, 
and BOB GARWOOD, 
Defendant-Appellant.) 
) 
Case No. 18164 
****************************** 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
****************************** 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
An action for forceable entry and detainer by Fashion 
Four Corporation and Elgin Williams, as Lessee (Respondents 
herein), against Fashion Place Associates, as Lessor (Appellant 
herein), pursuant to the provisions of Title 78-36-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court found that the "locking out" of the 
Plaintiffs from the leased premises by Fashion Place Associates 
constituted forceable entry and detainer in violation of Title 
78-36-2, U.C.A. 1953 as amended and awarded Plaintiffs money 
damages, attorney's fees and a permanent injunction restraining 
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Defendant, Fashion Place Associates from interfering with 
Plaintiffs peaceable possession and occupancy of the leased 
premises in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
Lease Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents, Fashion Four Corporation and Elgin Williams 
(Plaintiffs below) ask the Court to dismiss the appeal and 
affirm the judgment of the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about May 6, 1974, Fashion Four Corporation and 
Elgin Williams, the Plaintiff-Respondents (hereinafter Fashion 
Four) entered into a Lease Agreement (hereinafter Lease Agreement) 
with Defendant-Appellant, Fashion Place Associates, (hereinafter 
Fashion Place) of certain premises located at the Fashion Place 
Mall in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (T. 27) (R. 8) (Findings 
No. 1) From May 6, 1974 to June 11, 1981, transfers of this 
Lease Agreement were made, concluding with an assignment back 
to Fashion Four on June 11, 1981. Eight days later, on or about 
June 19, 1981, without any statutory formality or compliance, 
Fashion Place, through its assistant manager, Bob Garwooq, locked 
the premises and thereby locked Fashion Four out from their 
actual and peaceable possession. (T. 43) (Findings, No. 11, 13, 
17) (Conclusions No. 4, 5) 
Specifically, the above referred transfers occured 
chronologically as follows: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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"Charley's", a women's ready to wear business, which had 
been operated in conformance with the Lease Agreement from the 
outset by Fashion Four, was sold by Fashion Four, by written 
Agreement, to Norsal Development Corporation (hereinafter Norsal) 
during September, 1978 (T. 4,28) (Findings No. 3) Concurrent with 
this sale, Fashion Four assigned the Lease Agre~ment to Norsal, 
subject to Fashion Place's written consent to said assignment. 
(T. 30) (Findings No. 4) Fashion Place never did give written 
consent to this assignment, (T. 30-32) (R. 20) (Findings No. 7) 
(Conclusions No. 3) but has throughout this action admitted that 
consent to the assignment had been given. (T. 149) (Findings No. 9) 
Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Lease Agreement reads: 
"If the" tenant hereunder is a corpor-
ation ... the transfer, assignment or 
hypothecation of any stock or interest 
in such corporation ... in the aggregate 
in excess of twenty-five percent (25%) 
shall be deemed an assignment within 
the meaning of Article 15." (R. 20) 
Norsal entered into possession of the subject premises 
and operated "Charley's" to June 11, 1981. (T. 35-38,86-87) 
During the third quarter of 1979 shareholders of Norsal, includ-
ing Hugh Gardner, transferred all of Norsal stock, being more 
than 25% of same to Neil Davidson, previously a small shareholder. 
This transfer was consununated in November, 1979. (T. 91-93) 
(Findings, No. 6) There was no assignment or consent for assign-
ment by Fashion Place of the Lease Agreement pursuant to this 
transfer, as defined by Article 15 of the Lease Agreement. 
~~ -3-
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At trial, Fashion Place argued that they had no knowledge 
of this stock transfer. Yet, Fashion Place's attorney, Raymond 
Berry, admitted that he examined a file as early as August, 1980, 
that indicated Neil Davidson (hereinafter Davidson) was operating 
"Charley's". (T. 109) Further, law suits for back rent were 
brought by Fashion Place against Norsal Development Corporation, 
Neil Davidson as an individual dba "Charley's", and qthers, 
including the suit of C 80-7830, noted in Findings of Fact No. 
21. (R. 203) Finally, Davidson was not involved in "Charley's" 
operation un~il November, 1979. Up to that time Norsal operated 
"Charley's" with a manager by the name of Nancy Love under the 
direction of Hugh Gardner. (T. 208) It was only after November, 
1979 that Davidson paid Fashion Place the rent for "Charley's". 
(T. 34, 11-20) (T. 208, 2-12) (Findings No. 8) Fashion Place 
accepted rents from Norsal and Davidson and recognized Norsal 
and Davidson to be the tenant in possession under the Lease. 
(T. 38-39, 41) In October, 1980, one (1) year after Davidson 
acquired the stock ownership of Norsal, "Charley's", the sole 
asset of Norsal, begain to experience financial difficulty. 
Consequently, Norsal became delinquent in rents due to Fashion 
Place and in payments due to Fashion Four under Agreement of 
Sale between Fashion Four and Norsal. (T. 100-103) 
In mid April, 1981, Elgin Williams contacted Tom Estes, 
the Mall manager, in regard to taking back the business of 
"Charley's" by assignment. (T. 3a,17) (Findings No. 10,12) 
It was Tom Estes response that the proposed use by Williams 
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would be very complimentary to the mall, the only apparent problem 
was the renegotiation of the Lease to a higher rent rate. 
(T. 39, 19-25; T. 40,1-10) In May, l981, Fashion Place wrote a 
letter to Davidson offering to forgive all back rents if Davidson 
would give up the space occupied by "Charley's". (T. 41) This 
offer was never accepted by Davidson. 
Negotiations between Davidson of Norsal and Williams of 
Fashion Four con~inued until an agreement was reached on June 
10, 1981. (T.42, 17) On June 11, 1981, Davidson, the principal 
officer and sole stockholder of Norsal, assigned "Charley's" 
and the Lease Agreement back to Fashion Four by executing a 
Repossession Agreement (Exhibit 3) R. 149·) ap.d an Assignment 
of Lease (Exhibit 4) (R. 150) with Williams; Jan Nielson wit-
·'? 
nessed the transaction and delivered the keys to Williams. 
(T. 87, 20; T. 90, 7) (Findings No. 12) During that day, both 
Davidson and Jan Nielsen told Tom Estes and Bob Garwood of the 
business transfer and the re-assignment of the Lease Agreement 
(T. 42-43) (T. 87,20; T. 88, 15-17) (T. 89, 96-98) (T. 208) 
No consent was given by Fashion Place for the above transaction. 
Unfortunately, also on June 11, 1981, a Norsal judgment 
creditor levied ag~inst the inventory and fixtures of "Charley's". 
This delayed the opening of the store, but said attachment action 
and the fact that negotiations had begun between the creditor and 
Fashion Four to alleviate the debt were known by Fashion Place 
that day. (T. 46-48) (Findings No. 15) Davidson had talked with 
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the attorney handling the attachment into leaving the merchandise 
and fixtures on the premises until Williams could make an arrange-
ment for disposition on the same. (T. 209) Williams finalized 
the purchase of the merchandise and fixtures on or about August 
1, 1981. (T. 48; 58) 
Fashion Four was in actual and proper possession from 
June 11, 1981 until June 19, 1981 when Fashion Place perpetrated 
forceable entry and detainer of said premises in violation of 
78-36-2 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) against Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
Fashion Four. (T. 43) (Findings No. 13) (Conclusions Nos. 1,4,5) 
Inspite of Fashion Four's demands for return of the premises 
and attempts to tender all back rents on June 11th, 19th and 
at later times, Fashion Place refused to restore said premises 
until July 31, 1981 as ordered to do so by the Court, at which 
time Fashion Four paid the rent. (T. 44-48) (Findings No. 13,22). 
Fashion Place claimed the premises had been abandoned 
pursuant to Title 78-36-12.3(3} U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
(T. 49; 120; 135) The claim of abandonment was an assumption 
on the part of the Mall's assistant manager, Bob Garwood) (T.156) 
Notices were not served upon Fashion Four, Williams, Norsal or 
Davidson pursuant to 78-36-8. 5 U .C .A. ( 1953 as amended) ·by 
Fashion Place at the time of the "locking out". (T. 50) (Findings 
No. 15) (R. 202) Little, if any, evidence of abandonment was 
presented at trial by Fashion Place. (Findings No. 16) (R. 202) 
Trial was held on October 6th and 7th before the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, and the Court made its Minute Entry in favor of 
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Plaintiff on October 23, 1981; after the parties had ~ub­
mitted Memorandums at the request and direction of the lower 
Court. (R. 180) The action of Fashion Four against Defendant, 
Bob Garwood was dismissed on motion at the conclusion of the 
case in that the Court determined that he was the agent of 
Fashion Place Associates and had no personal liability. (T. 213) 
Fashion Four was awarded $3,500.00 in damages and $7,000.00 
in attorney's fees and a permanent injunction prohibiting 
Fashion Place from interfering with Fashion Four's possession 
of the premises under the terms of the Lease. (R. 207) Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law~ Judgment and Permanent Injunction 
were duly entered by the Court on November 24, 1981. (R. 198-209) 
On November 25, 1981, Fashion Place properly moved for an 
amendment of the Judgment, of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions nf Law and for a new trial. (R. 211) This 
motion, after hearing, was denied by Court order on December 
7, 1981. (R. 215, 219) Judge Banks, during the hearing on 
the motion of Fashion Place for a new trial commented that he 
had been conservative and restrictive in awarding damages to 
Plaintiff and that the award of damages was low. Fashion 
Place did not file their Notice of Appeal for the present 
matter until January 5, 1982. (R. 222) 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PURSUANT TO RULE 73(a) U.R.C.P. AND 78-36-11 
U.C.A. 1953 AS .AMENDED, IN AN ACTION FOR 
FORCEABLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, FAILURE TO 
FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM 
THE DATE OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER TO BE 
APPEALED, FAILS TO GIVE THIS COURT JURIS-
DICTION FOR REVIEW. 
In Coombs v. Johnson, 484, P.2d 155 (Ut., 1971) this 
Court very curtly denied review of a forceable detainer action 
when it beca.~e apparent that 15 days had passed from the lower 
Court's order to the filing of the Notice of Appeal. 
In Brandley v. Lewis, 92 P.2d 338 (Ut., 1939) this 
Court determined that review would be denied for an untimely 
filing of the Notice of Appeal · under the shorter statutory period, 
only if it was determined that the matter truly was an action 
in unlawful detainer, rather than "one for a declaratory judg-
ment construing a contract." 
A. THIS MATTER IS ONE OF FORCEABLE ENTRY 
AND DETAINER. 
The action brought by Fashion Four against Fashion Place 
is for forceable entry and detainer, in that Fashion Place 
"(4) ... entered and took possession and occupancy 
(of the premises), and have locked out the 
Plaintiff's from said premises ... 
(5) ... contrary to the rights of Plaintiff pursuant 
to said Lease Agreement, and the provisions of 
78-36-2 ... " (R. 3) 
Further, this matter was tried and adjudicated as an 
action in forceable entry and detainer. (Findings Nos. 1,3,13, 
14, 17, 18, 22) (Conclusions Nos. 1, 4, 5) . P&&•••&& u 
/' 
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p.2d 507 (Ut. 1965) 
Finally, although the facts of this case are involved, 
they have been put forward to establish a simple fact pattern. 
Fashion Four was in actual peaceable possession of the premises 
for more than five (5) days before Fashion Place forceably 
entered and detained said premises, in violation of 78-36-2 
U.C.A. 
Brandley's (supra) analysis at 339, determined that an 
involved fact pattern did not necessarily mean the case is one 
in declaratory judgment: 
"To determine therefore whether Defendant was 
in unlawful detainer the Court must determine 
the meaning and eff~ct of the paragraph (of the 
contract), but that does not change the action 
from one in unlawful detainer. It is merely 
deciding a question, the decision of which is 
necessary in makipg a determination as to whether 
the Defendant is in unlawful detainer." 
Similarly, the examination of the enforceability of 
Article 15 here, does not transmute the character from being an 
action in forceable entry and detainer; further, the preliminary 
injunction requested and temporary restraining order was merely 
enforcement of the forceable entry and detainer remedy and con-
sistent therewith. Anderson v. Granite School District, 413 
P.2d 597 (Ut., 1966) 
B. 78-36-11 U.C.A., 1953 AS AMENDED, PROVIDES 
10 DAYS TO APPEAL DECISIONS IN FORCEABLE ENTRY 
AND DETAINER." 
Rule 73(a) of the U.R.C.P. states: 
" ... the time within which an appeal may be 
taken shall be one month from the date of the 
entry in the Register of Actions of the judgment 
or order appealed from unless a shorter time is 
"'-~~~-,-~_aw " (emphasis added) 
-,-~~-~-~-.~7"\nr~ 
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With respect to actions within Chapter 36 of Title 78, 
including those pursuant to 78-36-2, 78-36-11 reads in its 
entirety: 
"Either party may, within 10 days, appeal 
from the judgment rendered." 
This has been interpreted by Coombs: 
"The judgment was entered on July 1, 1970 and 
the Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal from 
that judgment on July 15, 1970. It is apparent 
that the appeal was not taken within the time 
prescribed by Section 78-36-11 U.C.A. 1953, 
and this Court is without jurisdiction to 
entertain it." (emphasis added) Coombs, P. 155 
Utah follows the rule of statutory interpretation expresse1 
by the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," which 
interpreted means that a statute that mandates a thing to be 
done in a given manner and/or by certain entities shall not be 
done in any other manner.· Accordingly, the appeal of Fashion 
Place should be dismissed and the lower Court decision should 
stand affirmed on the grounds that Appellants filed an untimely 
Notice of Appeal and this Court is without jurisdiction to enter-
tain it. 
POINT II 
CONSENT OF LANDLORD, FASHION PLACE, FOR THE 
REASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE FROM NORSAL-DAVIDSON 
TO FASHION FOUR WAS NOT REQUIRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW (Conclusion No. 2) 
"As pointed out in Coulas v. Desimone 208 P.2d 
105 (Wash, 1949), it has been held that such a 
covenant is not broken where the assignment, 
executed without the lessor's consent, is made 
by the assignee back to the original lessee. 
The reason therefore is stated in McCormick 
v. Stowell, 138 Mass. 431 (Mass., 1885) as 
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follows: ' by the Lease, itself, the lessor 
consents to take the lessee as his tenant for 
the full term mentioned in the lease.' " 
(emphasis added) 
Shoemaker v. Shaug, 490 P.2d 439, 442 (Wash., 1971) 
See also Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 204, 
212 (Alk. I 1980) 
Good law, like truth and equity, stands the test of time. 
McCormick, Coulas, Shoemaker and Hendrickson each had problems 
that required solutions in fairness, in face of a lease forfeiture. 
While only the first three cases involved an assignment back to 
a prior tenant, they each found their solution in equity after 
each Court considered the unfavored status of the lease-clause 
which restrained alienation by contractual negotiation. 
"although forfeitures for breach by assign-
ment have been approved if authorized by 
language in the Lease forfeitures are not 
favored and never enforced in equity unless 
the right is so clear as to permit no 
denial. Shoemaker v. Shag, 490 P.2d 439, 
411 (Wash., 1971)" Hendrickson, 212. 
"However, such covenants, being restraints 
upon alienation by lessee, are not favored 
in the law and are strictly construed." 
Coulas, 110. 
In Hendrickson, after the leased property changed owner-
ship, Hendrickson, the new owner, gave written notice that the 
lease would be strictly construed and specifically noted the 
consent for assignment clause. Six days later, the tenant in 
possession assigned the lease, without consent, to a third person. 
The Court had no choice but to forfeit the lease; strict compli-
ance had been followed by the landlord and no equities favored 
the third party tenant. 
--~~ -11-
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However, McCormick, Coulos and Shoemaker each had non-
consented lease assignments back to a prior party of the lease. 
When each of these parties entered the lease agreement, they did 
so with the consent of the landlord for the duration of the lease. 
Consequently, each of these Courts upheld the assignment and 
the lease back to the respective prior tenant. 
Appellant argues that the landlord should not be required 
to predict the economic future of its tenants. This is erroneous, 
if there were such doubt, the lease term would be shorter. 
Further, this is a red herring, as noted in dicta by Judge Jay 
E. Banks, the real issue for Fashion Place withholding consent 
is that, as Fashion Four claimed, lease re~ts had gone up. 
The original lease calls for a rent-rate of $9.40 per square 
foot per year, while on June 11, 1981 Fashion Place claimed the 
market rate was $16.00 per square foot per year. (T. 162, 17-21; 
T. 40, 1-10; T. 161, 19-22; T. 162, 5-6) 
The equities of the cases above speak directly to the 
matter of financial loss. Here, it is clear that withholding 
consent would cost Fashion Four the benefit of their bargain, 
their rent-rate, not to mention the loss of their leasehold 
improvements; while in the alternative, Fashion Place would 
lose nothing. 
Fashion Place has a firm financial reason for breaking 
the lease, the prospect of higher rents. Clearly such a motivation 
would do violence to Article 33 of the subject Lease Agreement, 
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where the landlord is proscribed from unreasonably withholding 
consent. (R. 35) Pursuant to the argument above, it is a matter 
of law and equity that Fashion Four be allowed to re-enter the 
premises without further consent from Fashion Place. :The dee-
ision and judgment of the lower Court should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
FAILURE OF FASHION PLACE TO PERFORM IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH ARTICLE 15 WAIVED ANY RIGHT OF FORFEITURE 
FOR BREACH OF CONDITION AGAINST ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT 
WRITTEN CONSENT. 
It is undisputed that the subject Lease Agreement is 
a very sophicated document, with its 31 pages, 35 Articles and 
it.s 6 attached Exhibits, A through F. Especially when one 
considers the delineated procedures displayed in Article 15 
which governs how written consent for lease assignments shall 
be given. (R. 20) 
This procedure calls for written consent from the land-
lord to precede any assignment; secondly, it requires a writing 
satisfactory to the landlord between assignor and assignee in 
each instance; thirdly, it demands a written assumption of lia-
bility of the Lease Agreement by assignee, of Lessee's terms, 
for the benefit of the landlord; and finally, it requires the 
executed writing to be delivered to the landlord. 
None of the assignors, nor any of the assignees to the 
transfers noted in the Statement of Facts herein, could compel 
Fashion Place to comply with the procedures of its own writing. 
-13-
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When Fashion Four asked for consent, by Fashion Place's own 
choice, they did not pro~ide Fashion Four or Norsal with a 
written consent prior to the assignment. Instead, Fashion Place 
proffered a second document, by design, to be signed by Fashion 
Four, Norsal and Fashion Place, contrary to the procedures of 
Article 15. Since this document was not signed by Norsal as 
assignee or Fashion Place as the landlord it has no force or 
effect. (Conclusions No. 3) Consequently, no written consent 
exists for this assignment. 
No consent, written or otherwise, nor any assignment 
was made following the Norsal stock sale transfer to Davidson, 
as defined by paragraph 3 of Article 15. Nor was any objection 
raised by Fashion Place when the transfer-sale became apparent. 
Fashion Place knew a change of ownership had occurred, 
as evidenced by their acceptance of rent from Hugh Gardner for 
the first year of Norsal's possession, and from Neil Davidson 
for the second year of Norsal's possession. (Findings No. 8) 
A presumption is raised that the lease has been assigned, when a 
person other than the prior tenant in possession begins to pay 
rent. Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp. 507 P.2d 713 (Ut., 1973) 
Further, Fashion Place brought two (2) suits for back 
rent collectively against the corporation, Norsal Development, 
and the individual, Neil Davidson, dba "Charley's" (Findings 
No. 21) 
Finally, no notice was ever given other than the original 
Lease Agreement of 1974, that Article 15 would be strictly enforcec 
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"It is a well settled principle of law that 
where a landlord has led the tenant to 
believe that strict compliance of a covenant 
will not be required, the landlord cannot 
thereafter demand forfeiture of the lease 
without first giving the tenant notice that 
strict compliance of the lease will be 
demanded in the future." Hendrickson, 
211 n.6, See also Duncan v. Malcomb, 351 
S.W. 2d 419 (Ark., 1961) 
The lessor is responsible for his conduct and dealings 
with his tenants and their assigns under the lease, especially 
when the lessor is in conflict with the lease. In Kinter v. Harr, 
408 P.2d 487 (Manto, 1965), a tenant-assignee to a lease con-
taining a "no assignment without consent" clause, was deemed 
responsible for the lease, even though, no consent for the 
assignment was ever given. The Court said, at 496, 
"That provision (the consent clause) is for the 
benefit of the lessor and may be waived by 
accepting rents from the assignee and permitt-
ing him to remain in possession." 
See also Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 
182 P.2d 132, 187 (Ca., 1947); Sun World Corp. 
v. Pennysavers, Inc., 637 P.2d 1088, 1092 
(Ariz., 1981) 
Appelrant puts forward two (2) cases against waiver. 
Nashville Record Prod. v. Mr. Transmission, 623 S.W. 2d 281 
(Tenn., 1981) and Warmack v. Merchant National Bank of Fort 
Smith, 612 s.w. 2d 733 (Ark., 1981) 
Nashville involves rental payments; its legal status 
is not on the same plane as here, where alienation of property 
transfers are at issue. Warmack involves a controverted 
assignment to an operation in direct competition with a present 
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Mall tenant. Its fact pattern and law are not comparable here. 
The contract is a continuing relationship between the 
parties, like the law it changes in accordance with the times, 
as exhibited by the parties course of dealings. Certainly, the 
lease assigned to the assignee should be the same as the lease 
the assignor operated under, including those terms modified or 
waived by the landlord unless notice of strict compliance is 
timely reiterated. 
CONCLUSION 
This case involves an unconsented re-assignment of a 
lease back to the original tenant of the Lease Agreement, and the 
subsequent forceable entry and detainer by the landlord. The 
first item to decide is whether Fashion Place, in locking out 
Fashion Four, violated 78-36-2. If this decision is in the 
affirmative, procedurally this Court is without jurisdiction 
to entertain the appeal due to the untimely filing of the Notice 
of Appeal by Fashion Place pursuant to Rule 73(a) U.R.C.P. and 
78-36-11. 
An item not discussed above, was the claim of abandon-
ment of the premises by Fashion Place as justifying its acts. 
This position was factually unsupported at trial and the Court 
properly concluded that there was no abandonment. (Conclusions 
No. 8) Also see Kasson v. Stout, 507 P.2d 87 (Ca., 1973) 
Appellant argues that the law of McCormick is archaic, 
that the practice of preserving the lessor's consent for each 
assignee of the lease for the duration of the lease, is out of 
date. Appellant further argues that it is a "sinqle hidden excepti 
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when cited in Coulas. Respondent disagrees. The restriction 
on assignment without the consent of Fashion Place ceased to 
be operative under the facts and circumstances of this case 
and the general principals of law cited. Consent of Fashion 
Place to the re-assignment of the lease from Norsal-Davidson 
to Fashion Four as the original lessee was not required. 
Good law, however old, withstands time. The equities 
of McCormick can be traced all the way to Hendrickson the 1980 · 
case from Alaska. It is these equities that cry out against 
Fashion Place's unreasonable withholding of their consent from 
a prior tenant as leverage to raise rent, this case law must be 
reiterated in this jurisdiction. 
Lease forfeitures are unfavored in the law. Typically, 
without strict compliance of the leas~, equity will save the 
lease. The overall effect is that without the landlord's strict 
compliance of the lease terms, as was not the case here, the 
forfeiting clause is waived. Accordingly, the decision and 
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